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And the Winner Is... Trial Lawyers:
When Does an Accommodation Under Title
III of the ADA
Represent a Fundamental Alteration of
Competitive Sports?
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin'
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a beautiful day at the ball park, the sun is shining high in the sky and
a father and son are enjoying a day together watching the great American
pastime. The bases are loaded, the game is tied, there are two outs, the count is
full, and the home team is up to bat. With sweat dripping off his cap, the
opposing pitcher hurls a fastball down the middle of the plate as the umpire cries
"strike three." The boy's head drops in disappointment, but his father quickly
reminds him that the batter suffers from attention deficit disorder and, because
of his disability, he gets an extra strike.2
Baseball fans would certainly agree that limiting a batter to three strikes is
an essential and fundamental rule of baseball. Surely, anyone who would
actually seek a modification of this rule-a rule as old as the game
itself-because of a disability, would be laughed out of court, right? Prior to the
United States Supreme Court's decision inPGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, fans could
rest comfortably knowing that their games would stay true to the traditions they
hold dear. After the decision, however, it appears that no rule, no matter how
well established, is safe from a judicial determination that the rule is not
fundamental and, thus, may be altered to accommodate individuals with
disabilities. In PGA Tour, the Supreme Court forever changed when a proposed
modification in competitive sports will be denied based on the fundamental
alteration defense3 under Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act
1. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
2. See id. at 702-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that
"[o]ne can envision the parents of a Little League player with attention deficit disorder
trying to convince ajudge that their son's disability makes it at least 25% more difficult
to hit a pitched ball. (If they are successful, the only thing that could prevent a court
order giving the kid four strikes would be ajudicial determination that, in baseball, three
strikes are metaphysically necessary, which is quite absurd.)." Id.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
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("ADA").4 With the decision, the Supreme Court opened the floodgates for
possible litigation while hurting both competitive sports and disabled athletes.5
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
PGA Tour, Inc. ("PGA Tour") is a nonprofit organization that sponsors
professional golf tournaments and events presented in three annually occurring
tours.6 There are various ways for players to qualify for these tours, the most
common being known as the "Q-School."7 Any individual may enter the Q-
School by obtaining the necessary letters of recommendation and paying the
$3,000 entry fee.8 According to PGA Tour rules, golf carts are permitted during
the first two stages of the Q-School.9 Since 1997, however, golf carts are
prohibited during the third and final stage.'
Casey Martin is a professional golfer with a disability that falls squarely
within the definition set forth in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.11
Martin has Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, a progressive circulatory
disorder resulting in severe pain and atrophy in his right leg.'2 Not only does his
disorder make walking painful, but it creates "a significant risk of hemorrhaging,
developing blood clots, and fracturing his tibia so badly that an amputation might
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
5. PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 691-705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 665.
7. Id. at 665-66. The Q-School is a three-stage process. Id. Every year, over a
thousand contestants begin the first stage, consisting of four, eighteen-hole rounds at
various locations with roughly halfthe contestants qualifying for the second stage, where
the field is further narrowed. Id. at 666. Finally, approximately 168 players advance to
the final stage, where a 108-hole tournament is played. Id. Typically, the top twenty-
five percent gain membership in the PGA Tour, with the rest of the finalists obtaining
membership in the NIKE Tour (now called the BUY.com tour). Id.
8. Id. at 665-66.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 666. There are three sets of rules that govern PGA Tour events. Id. The
"Rules of Golf' apply to both amateur and professional events and do not prohibit the
use of golf carts. Id. The "hard card" on the other hand, applies specifically to PGA
professional tours and prohibits the use of golf carts in tournaments except in "open
qualifying" events and the seniors tour. Id. at 666-67. Finally, "notices to competitors"
are rules designed for particular tournaments and specific conditions within those
tournaments. Id. at 667.
11. Id. at 668. "The term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual--(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000)).
12. Id. Specifically, Martin's disability "obstructs the flow of blood from his right
leg back to his heart." Id.
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be required."'3 Because of his disability, Martin was permitted the use of a cart
throughout his collegiate career and, after he became a professional, was
permitted to use a cart during the first two stages of the PGA's Q-School.' 4
Upon qualifying for the third stage of the Q-School, Martin submitted a request
with supporting detailed medical records for permission to utilize a golf cart
during the third stage.'5 PGA Tour did not review Martin's medical records and
refused to waive its no cart rule for the final stage of qualification. 6
Martin filed his original action seeking a permanent injunction 7 in the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon, based on the premise that,
because PGA Tour is a commercial entity and a public accommodation, it is
subject to the ADA's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of a disability."
The honorable Thomas M. Coffin, United States Magistrate Judge, entered
partial summary judgment for Martin 9 and, after a bench trial, entered a
permanent injunction requiring PGA Tour to allow Martin the use of a cart.2"
The district court rejected PGA Tour's argument in its summary judgment
motion that Title III of the ADA did not apply to PGA Tour because it was a
"private club or establishment' '2 or that the areas reserved for tour competition
did not constitute places of public accommodation within the scope of that title.'
Magistrate Judge Coffm reasoned that PGA Tour is a commercial enterprise
rather than a private club, that the statutory definition of public accommodation
included golf courses,' and that operators of public accommodations could not,
13. Id.
14. Id. at 668-69. Martin attended Stanford University, which requested and
received a waiver from the National Collegiate Athletics Association ("NCAA") of the
rule requiring players to walk and carry their own clubs. Id. at 668. The hard card rules
permit the use of carts during the first two stages of the Q-School. Id. at 669.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998), aftd, 204 F.3d
994 (9th Cir. 2000) aff'd, 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
18. Id. at 1323.
19. Id. at 1327.
20. Id.
21. "The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to private clubs or
establishments exempted from coverage under Title II ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
U.S.C. 2000-a(e)) [42 U.S.C. 2000a et seq.] or to religious organizations or entities
controlled by religious organizations, including places of worship." 42 U.S.C. § 12187
(2000).
22. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323-27; 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (2000).
2002]
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in his view, relegate the ADA to only certain areas within a facility by creating
separate enclaves within the accommodation.24
At trial, PGA Tour argued that walking the course during a round of golf
in a tournament is a crucial element of the competition and part of the
substantive rules of the game, and, thus, any waiver of the rule would present a
fundamental alteration of the nature of that competition.' Rejecting PGA Tour's
argument, the district court held that the walking-the-course rule was designed
to inject an element of fatigue into the game, but that the element of fatigue
could not be deemed significant.21 The district court further reasoned that, even
with a cart, Martin would have to walk approximately twenty-five percent of the
course or roughly one and one-fourth miles.27 Thus, because of Martin's
condition, he actually experienced-a greater amount of pain and fatigue than the
otherplayers, and accommodating him with a cart would not fundamentally alter
the nature of PGA Tour's game.28
PGA Tour appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which affirmed the district court's ruling.29 In the case, PGA Tour
renewed its claim that the area of the tournament reserved for tour competition
is not a public accommodation because, generally, that area is off limits to the
public.3" The court of appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that, because
any member of the public has a right to pay the entry fee and try out in the Q-
School, the behind-the-ropes portion of the tournament is a public
accommodation,3' and the fact that users of a facility must compete to qualify
does not mean that the facility cannot be a public accommodation.3 2 In an
analysis similar to that used by the district court, the court of appeals viewed the
issue "not [as] whether use of carts generally would fundamentally alter the
competition, but whether the use of a cart by Martin would do so."33
24. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1326-27.
25. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1250 (D. Or. 1998).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1251.
28. See id. at 1253.
29. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 995 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 532 U.S.
661 (2001).
30. Id. at 997.
31. Id. at 999.
32. Id. at 998. The court of appeals compared the PGA Tour tournaments to a
private university, explaining "[f]or example, Title III includes in its definition
'secondary, undergraduate, orpostgraduate private school[s].' 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J).
The competition to enter the most elite private universities is intense, and a relatively
select few are admitted. The fact does not remove the universities from the statute's
definition as places of public accommodation." Id.
33. Id. at 1001.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Ninth Circuit's
decision.34 The Supreme Court held that when golfers pay PGA Tour a fee for
the chance to compete in its competitions and subsequent tour events, it is
appropriate to classify those golfers as "clients or customers" under Title III of
the ADA,35 and allowing a golfer with a disability the use of a cart despite the
tour walking requirement is not a modification that would "fundamentally alter
the nature" of the competition and, thus, is required by Title I of the ADA.36
IIH. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Foundation: The Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") was enacted in 1990 with a
broad congressional goal of "provid[ing] a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities" and "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards."
The ADA defines discrimination as a "failure to make reasonable
modifications," and liability for such failure may only be avoided if the
modification "would fundamentally alter" the good or service.3
In order to achieve its broad goals, Congress designed the ADA to cover a
wide range of disabilities, as well as specific types of entities subject to the
ADA's regulations. 9 The ADA is separated into four titles, each distinguished
34. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661,691 (2001). Justice Stevens wrote the
opinion of the Court. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined, filed a dissenting
opinion. Id. at 664.
35. Id. at 679-81.
36. Id. at 689-91.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2000).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2) (2000). The Act provides:
It is the purpose of the chapter-
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals
with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power
to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000).
39. See Roy R. Galewski, The Casey Martin and Ford Olinger Cases: The
2002]
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by the type of entity being regulated. Title I of the statute is applicable to
discrimination within an employment relationship.' Discrimination involving
a "public entity" is covered under Title II of the statute.4 A "public entity" is a
function of any State or local government, including agencies and departments.42
The requirements for providing telecommunications access are covered under
Title IVW of the ADA and most commonly cover services to individuals
suffering from hearing or speech-impaired disabilities."
Title III, the provision of the ADA applied in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,"
prohibits discrimination by "public accommodations."' The statute does not
define "public accommodation." Rather, it provides an exhaustive list of the
types of entities that will be considered public accommodations.47 A golf course
is specifically listed within the statute,48 along with other types of recreational
facilities.49 The primary purpose of Title HI is to allow those individuals with
a disability the "full and equal enjoyment" of the services offered by the public
accommodations without being subject to discrimination."0 The statute provides
a broad description of what constitutes discrimination, including the "failure to
make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, orprocedures ... unless the
entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally
alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations."'"
Supreme Court Takes a Swing atADA Uncertainty, 21 PACEL. REV. 411,426-27 (2001).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2000).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2000).
44. See Galewski, supra note 39, at 427.
45. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000). "No individual shall be discriminated against on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations ofanyplace ofpublic accommodation by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation."
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (2000).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (2000). The statute states that a public
accommodation includes: "a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golfcourse, or other
place of exercise or recreation." 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (2000).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000); see supra note 46.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
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The Rehabilitation Act of 197352 served as the foundation for the Americans
with Disabilities Act.13 With its original goal of protecting government
employees, the Rehabilitation Act has proved a valuable tool in interpreting the
provisions of the ADA. 4 Particularly, courts have used the language of the
Rehabilitation Act to interpret the requirements for providing "reasonable
accommodations" for individuals with disabilities without causing an "undue
hardship" on the public accommodation.55 InSoutheastern Community College
v. Davis56 the Supreme Court grappled with these issues and forever linked the
Rehabilitation Act to the ADA. In that case, the Supreme Court58 reasoned
that, by the plain meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, the word "reasonable" could
not include any action that would present undue financial and administrative
burdens 9 on the accommodation or that would result in any "fundamental
alteration in the nature" of the accommodation.' Following this decision,
Congress included the "fundamental alteration" language in the ADA when it
was enacted in 1990,61 but left the term largely undefined, and, thus, open to
court analysis.
B. The Supreme Court Analyzes the "Fundamentally Alters"
Exception
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the "fundamentally alters"
exception with a discussion of its Southeastern Community College v. Davis
opinion.62 In Davis, the Supreme Court held that the modifications necessary for
a nursing school to admit a student with a serious hearing disability 3 and train
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797(b) (2000).
53. See Galewski, supra note 39, at 428.
54. See Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir.
1995).
55. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987);
Southeastern Cmty. College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,410-12 (1979); Stern v. Univ. of
Osteopathic Med. & Health Sciences, 220 F.3d 906, 908 (8th Cir. 2000); Morisky v.
Broward County, 80 F.3d 445, 447 (1lth Cir. 1996); Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425,
429 (7th Cir. 1995); Means v. City of Dayton, 11 F. Supp. 2d 969,977 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
56. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
57. See id. at 410-13; 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797(b) (2000).
58. Justice Powell wrote the opinion of the Court. Davis, 442 U.S. at 400.
59. Id. at 410.
60. See id.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
62. 442 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1979).
63. Id. at 400. Francis B. Davis was diagnosed with a "bilateral, sensori-neural
hearing loss," and a hearing aid helped her in recognizing "gross sounds occurring in the
2002]
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that individual properly under the Rehabilitation Act would result in a
"fundamental alteration in the nature"" of the nursing program and was far more
than the "modification" the language of the Rehabilitation Act required.6"
In its decision, the Supreme Court analyzed two important factors. First,
the Court went into a detailed analysis of the individual student with the
disability. The Court considered the extent of the individual's disability," as
well as the possibility of technological advancements that would aid the
individual disability. s7 The individual's specific abilities in lipreading and
effective communication skills were also analyzed.6 Second, the Court
examined the character of the nursing program in detail.69 The Court went to
great lengths to describe the nature of the nursing program and the importance
of the curriculum and effective communications, 0 especially in emergency
situations.7' With these considerations in mind, the Court concluded that the
modifications to the nursing program would be so extensive that they would
essentially alter the very nature of the program itself.72 There is a difference, the
Court noted, between "evenhanded treatment of qualified handicapped persons
and affirmative efforts to overcome the disabilities caused by handicaps."73 The
latter would require such modifications as to put an undue hardship on individual
accommodations. 74
When considering a case under the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court
found "two powerful but countervailing considerations. 75 In Alexander v.
Choate, the Court noted that there is a continuing tension between individual
analysis of the disabled person as required by the statute and the analysis of the
accommodation, which is necessary to keep the statute within "manageable
bounds. 76 Without this consideration, "[t]he formalization and policing of this
listening environment." She had a great deal of difficulty hearing speech, however. Id.
64. Id. at 410.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 401.
67. Id. at 412.
68. Id. Even with a hearing aid, "[h]er lipreading skills would remain necessary
for effective communication." Id.
69. Id. at 401-04.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 403.
72. Id. at 410-12. Even if the nursing program changed, the disabled individual
"would not receive even a rough equivalent of the training a nursing program normally
gives." Id. at 410.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 413.
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process could lead to a wholly unwieldy administrative and adjudicative
burden.""
After its decision in Alexander v. Choate, however, the Supreme Court
began to shift the balance of its analysis, placing more weight on the
consideration of the disabled individual. The change in the balance began in
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.78 In that case, the Supreme Court
again considered a disability under the Rehabilitation Act and determined that
a detailed analysis of the facts surrounding the individual's disability is essential
to achieve the goal of "protecting handicapped individuals from deprivations."79
Only after engaging in this detailed analysis will the Court then look to the two-
part test cited in Davis"0 to determine if the accommodation is reasonable and
would not result in a fundamental alteration of the entity." The case marked the
beginning of a permanent shift in the "fundamental alteration' analysis.
C. The Exception Applied to Competitive Sports
Prior to the decision in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,2 the Supreme Court had
yet to hear a case applying Title III of the ADA to competitive sports. There
were, however, a number of federal circuit court of appeal and district court
decisions on the issue. Through these cases, a specific analysis was developed
in which the nature of the individual accommodation is considered in detail.
In Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, Inc.
("MHSAA"), two high school students challenged the MHSAA's rule
prohibiting students from competing after reaching the age of nineteen." Both
students suffered from learning disabilities, causing them to fall behind the rest
of their class and, thus, they were already nineteen when their senior year
began. 5 The students sued under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and the
district court granted a preliminary injunction allowing them to compete in high
school sports.8 6 Reversing this decision, the United States Court of Appeals for
Sixth Circuit held that any waiver of the age rule would fundamentally alter the
77. Id. at 298.
78. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
79. See id. at 287.
80. See Southeastern Cmty. College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,410 (1979).
81. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287.
82. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
83. 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
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MHSAA's sports program.8 7 The Sixth Circuit held that, in applying Title III of
the ADA, the "critical inquiry will typically be the nature of the place to which
the disabled individual alleges unequal access." 8 Specifically, Title III of the
ADA protects individuals with disabilities from "unequal enjoyment of'place[s]
of public accommodation.""'9 The court focused on the purposes behind the age
restriction" and noted that it would be a "daunting task"' to conduct an
individual evaluation of every student affected by the age restriction to determine
if accomodation would be unreasonable.92 Thus, the court found that such a
waiver would result in a fundamental alteration.93
The Sixth Circuit heard a similar case involving MHSAA's age restriction
in McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, Inc.' Under the
rule challenged in that case, students were limited to eight semesters of high
school eligibility." A student with a learning disability brought suit under the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act, challenging the rule.96 Citing Sandison, the court
held that imposing a duty on the MHSAA to make an individual inquiry into
each student's level of maturity and athletic ability would force "near-impossible
determinations" and impose an "immense financial and administrative burden."
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals weighed in on high school athletic age
restrictions in Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities Association
("MSHSAA")." Again, a student with a learning disability that forced him to
repeat two grade levels challenged the MSHSAA's rule limiting participation to
students eighteen years of age and under." In approving the association's denial
of a waiver, the Eighth Circuit determined that the rule was critical and that
waiving it would result in a fundamental alteration of the program.10° The court
examined the facts surrounding the association, explaining that if individual
87. Id. at 1035.
88. Id. at 1036.
89. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000)).
90. Id. at 1035. The purpose of the age restriction is to prevent injury to players
and to avoid the advantage an older, more physically mature, athlete might have. Id.
91. Id. at 1037.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997).
95. Id. at 455.
96. Id. at 457.
97. Id. at 462 (citing Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1028).
98. 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994).
99. Id. at 928.
100. Id. at 931.
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inquiries were required of every student athlete, the association would face an
"undue financial and administrative burden."''
Finally, in Olinger v. U.S. Golf Association, 2 ("USGA") the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit faced a case of a disabled golfer
challenging the association's no-cart rule.' Considering facts almost identical
to those inPGA Tour, the court upheld the decision to deny the waiver of the no-
cart rule."' In the opinion, the court focused on the specific program involved
and not the specific circumstances of the disabled individual.'05 Primarily, the
court determined that allowing a disabled individual to ride a cart was not
unreasonable in the general sense, but forcing the USGA to analyze every
disabled individual that applied to ride in a cart in order to make sure that the
individual would not have an advantage over the other players would result in
an unreasonable administrative burden on the program." Furthermore, the only
way the USGA could effectively deal with this problem was to offer every
player the option of riding in a cart, which would be a fundamental alteration.' °7
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority
In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,' the United States Supreme Court began by
stating that the ADA was enacted to curb the ongoing discrimination of
individuals with disabilities" by eliminating the isolation and segregation of
those individuals in the critical areas of society."0 Furthermore, the Court noted
that the ADA created a "broad mandate""' to deal with discrimination and that
the Act's "most impressive strengths" were its "comprehensive character."' 2
101. Id.
102. 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated by 532 U.S. 1064 (2001).
103. Id. at 1001. Olinger suffered from "bilateral avascular necrosis," which
significantly impaired his ability to walk. Id.
104. Id. at 1001-07.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1006-07.
107. Id.
108. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
109. Id. at 675 (citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 20 (1989)); see also H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990).
110. PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 674-75; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (3)
(2000).
111. PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 675; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000).
112. PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 675 (quoting Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Handicapped on the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 10 1st Cong. 197
2002]
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After deciding that Title III applied to PGA Tour events as a public
accommodation, the Supreme Court turned its analysis to PGA Tour's
"fundamentally alters" defense.I" The Court stated that a two-part test must be
considered when deciding if a particular modification of a rule would
fundamentally alter the game itself. First, a court must consider if the proposed
modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the game or "might alter
such an essential aspect of the game of golf that it would be unacceptable even
if it affected all competitors equally.""' 4 Second, the court must consider
whether, even if the accommodation does not fundamentally alter the game, it
would have the effect of giving a disabled player an advantage over the other
athletes. In doing this, the personal circumstances of the individual disability
must be evaluated so as not to run "counter to the clear language and purpose of
the ADA.""..
Initially, the Court determined that the "essence of the game has been shot-
making-using clubs" so that the use of carts is not counter to the fundamental
character of the game of golf."6 In fact, the Court stated that in today's game,
carts are encouraged because they often speed up play and are sources of
revenue.' ' Furthermore, the "Rules of Golf' does not forbid the use of carts,
and, because PGA Tour's walking rule is based on optional provisions in the
appendix to the Rules of Golf, it is not an essential element of the game."' This
was established by the fact that golf carts are used in the Senior PGA Tour, the
open qualifying events for PGA Tour's tournaments, the first two stages of the
Q-School, and, until 1997, the third stage of the Q-School as well." 9
Next, the Court turned to PGA Tour's arguments. First, the Court
dismissed PGA Tour's position that the game of golf played professionally is
different and distinguished from the game played by thousands of amateurs
across the globe.' PGA Tour argued that "[t]he goal of the highest-level
competitive athletics is to assess and compare the performance of different
competitors, a task that is meaningful only if the competitors are subject to
(1989) (statement of Attorney General Thomburgh)).
113. Id. at 680-90.
114. Id. at 682.
115. Id. at 688.
116. Id. at 683.
117. Id. at 685.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 685-86.
120. Id. at 686-88.
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identical substantive rules.'' Any waiver of those rules, PGA Tour argued,
would fundamentally alter the nature of the game.'2
Instead of analyzing the game of golf and the similarities and differences
between golf played professionally and played by amateurs, the Court focused
on the walking rule and its effect on the game of golf generally."n PGA Tour
submitted that the walking rule is in place to "inject the element of fatigue into
the skill of shot-making."'2 4 As a result, PGA Tour argued that allowing Martin
to use a cart would fundamentally alter the game because he would not be
subject to the fatigue the other players must endure." The Supreme Court
rejected PGA Tour's walking rule argument on three bases. First, the Court held
that in the game of golf, it is impossible to guarantee that all competitors will
play under the same conditions every time.2 6 Moreover, the Court noted that
changes in the weather, luck, and chance also play apart in determining the final
outcome. 7 In fact, the Court found that these factors may have a "greater
impact" on the outcome of a golf tournament than the fatigue resulting from the
walking rule. 21
Next, the Court agreed with the district court finding that the fatigue the
players have as a result of the walking rule is insignificant. '2 Relying on expert
testimony, the Court analyzed the effects of walking the course and concluded
that "because golf is a low intensity activity, fatigue from the game is primarily
apsychological phenomenon."'"3 The Court stressed that when players are given
the option of riding in a cart, most golfers still choose to walk, either as a stress
reliever or to get a better feel for the conditions of the course.' As a result, the
121. Id. at 686 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 13, PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. 661
(2001) (No. 00-24)).
122. Id; see also Brief for Petitioner at 37, PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. 661 (2001)
(No. 00-24).
123. PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 686-90; see also Galewski, supra note 39, at416-
20.
124. PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 686 (quoting Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F.
Supp. 1242, 1250 (D. Or. 1998)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 686-87.
127. Id. at 687. In order to demonstrate that luck is a factor in the game of golf,
the Court noted a story in which a player, after driving the ball 322 yards on a par four
hole, saw his ball bounce off another player's putter and into the hole. Id. at 687 n.48.
128. Id. at 687.
129. Id.
130. Id.; see also Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1250 (D. Or.
1998).
131. PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 687-88. Nike Tour golfer Eric Johnson testified
in the district court proceeding that "walking allows him to keep in rhythm, stay warmer
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Court found the walking rule not to be an "outcome affecting" rule, and, thus,
its waiver would not fundamentally alter the nature of the game. 132
The Court's third reason for rejecting PGA Tour's argument was that,
assuming some element of fatigue is injected into the game by the walking rule,
Martin easily endured greater fatigue, even with a cart, than his walking
opponents did.'33 The Court again relied on expert testimony from the district
court proceeding to determine that Martin still must walk some portions of the
course (from the cart to his ball and back) and due to Martin's disability, he
actually suffered a greater amount of fatigue than the other players.34 Thus, the
Court found the walking rule was not compromised by allowing Martin the use
of a cart. 13S
Finally, the Court looked at the language of the ADA 36 and decided that
PGA Tour failed to make an individual inquiry into Martin's disability. 37 The
Court held that under Title III of the ADA, an "individualized inquiry' 1 31 must
be made with regard to whether an entity can make modifications to
accommodate a disability without fundamentally altering the entity itself.
Finding that there is "no exemption for elite athletics"'39 under Title III, the
Court noted that waiving the walking rule could be done in "individual cases"
without causing a fundamental alteration in the game.'11 The Court admitted that
this view of the ADA "imposes some administrative burdens" on PGA Tour but
decided that Congress intended to place this burden on the operator of a public
accommodation.' 41 The Court argued that a public accommodation such as PGA
Tour might receive a "handful" of requests to modify its game due to a person's
disability, so it would be able to make the necessary inquiry into the individuals
with disabilities and modify or waive rules to give those individuals access to the
competition. 42
when it is chilly, and develop a better sense of the elements and the course than riding
a cart." Id. at 688.
132. Id. at 688-89.
133. Id. at 690.
134. Id.; see also Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1252.
135. PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 690.
136. Specifically, the Court discussed 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000). See
also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 61; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 102, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303-05; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999)
("whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry").
137. PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 688.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 689.
140. Id.
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B. The Dissent
The dissent disagreed with the analysis of the majority as well as the "two-
part test" it established to resolve such disputes.'43 Justice Scalia began his
dissent with the "fundamentally alters" issue by stating that the language of Title
III "does not require a public accommodation to alter its inventory to include
accessible or special goods -with accessibility features that are designed for, or
facilitate the use by, individuals with disabilities."'" The "common sense of the
statute is that the content of the goods or services offered by a place of public
accommodation is not regulated."'45 Thus, the dissent argued there was no basis
for considering an alteration of the rules of a competition because the "PGA
TOUR cannot deny respondent access to that game because of his disability, but
it need not provide him a game different (whether in its essentials or in its
details) from that offered to everyone else."'"
Next, the dissent analyzed the first part of the two-part test developed by the
majority. The dissent disagreed altogether with the first part ofthe test: whether
or not an essential element of the game would be modified by the
accommodation. First, the dissent argued that because all rules are arbitrary
(essentially just made up by someone at some point in history), no court, not
even the Supreme Court, can say that a rule is nonessential if the rules of the
game deem it to be essential. 47 Justice Scalia wrote that it is "silly" to engage
in such analysis because it is quite absurd to say that any of a game's arbitrary
rules are essential."' Furthermore, the only support for the rules of any game is
"tradition" and what the ruling bodies in each sport deem significant. 49 For all
of these reasons, the dissent agreed with PGA Tour's position that a modification
of any rule is a fundamental alteration.
Turning its attention to the second prong of the majority's test, the dissent
began by dismissing the majority's reliance on the idea that luck or chance is a
critical factor of the game making it impossible to assure identical conditions for
every player and holding that "individual ability may not be the sole determinant
of the outcome."' 5° The dissent countered this position by noting that chance is
randomly distributed, but that allowing Martin the use of a cart "gives him a
143. See id. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent was joined by Justice
Thomas.
144. Id. at 698 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 28 CFR § 36.307 (2000)).
145. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins., 179 F.3d
557, 560 (7th Cir. 1999)).
146. Id. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 699-701 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 700-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 701 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 687.
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'lucky' break every time he plays."'' Furthermore, even if there are "nonhuman
variables" to the game, those variables apply equally to all players and the "fact
does not justify adding another variable that always favors one player.' ' s2
Finally, the dissent argued that by analyzing the fatigue issue of the walking
rule and holding that Martin would still be just as fatigued as every other player,
the majority set a dangerous precedent.' By "measuring the athletic capacity
of the requesting individual" and asking whether or not the proposed
modification gives that individual a competitive advantage given his or her
specific circumstances, the majority established that all future cases must be
decided "on the basis of individualized factual findings," making those future
cases "numerous, and a rich source of lucrative litigation."' 4 Not only would
this be an administrative nightmare, going above and beyond an undue burden,
the statute itself "provides no basis for this individualized analysis."'5s The
dissent argued that, in fact, the statute is designed to allow a disabled individual
equal access to the game, not to provide that individual with an equal chance at
winning. 1 6 Furthermore, because competitive sport is the measurement, by
uniform rules, of unevenly distributed talent, any effort to spread out that
distribution "artificially" by giving players exemptions from particular rules will
in effect "destroy the game."' 7
Justice Scalia further wrote that, in the long run, the majority's analysis may
have the net effect of harming players with disabilities.' 8 Justice Scalia argued
that, even though the majority's decision will force sports organizations to
review their rules and apply them equally at every level of competition, it also
encourages organizations "never voluntarily to grant any modifications" and end
tryouts that are available to the public at large. Is9
V. COMMENT
The Supreme Court inPGA Tour, Inc. held that allowing Martin, a disabled
individual, the use of a cart despite PGA Tour rules to the contrary did not
represent a modification that would fundamentally alter the nature of PGA Tour,
151. Id. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 702-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 704-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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a public accommodation under Title m of the ADA."6 The Court developed a
two-part test for analyzing similar situations involving the application of Title
III to competitive sports. 6' Under the first part of the test, a court must
determine if the proposed modification is of a rule that is an essential aspect of
the game."' Then, under the second part, a court must look at the facts
surrounding the disabled individual to determine if the modification would give
that individual a competitive advantage over the other player. 63 This test is a
clear departure from the analysis used by the majority of courts in applying Title
III and the fundamentally alters defense to competitive sports cases.164
As the dissent recognized, the majority's analysis and the test it utilized will
open the flood-gates of litigation. The Court failed to provide any standard that
organizers of competitive sports or, for that matter, any business owner could
possibly use to determine whether a particular accommodation would represent
a fundamental alteration of the sport or business. In PGA Tour, Inc.,65 PGA
Tour argued that walking is fumdamental to its tournaments.'" The Court,
however, analyzed whether walking is fundamental to the game of golf in
general." The majority failed to analyze the individual aspect of PGA Tour's
business, instead focusing on the rules of the game of golf generally.16 This has
the effect of allowing the judicial system to make ad hoc decisions of which
elements of sports are fundamental to the general character of the game and
which elements can be eliminated without recognizing the individual
characteristics of the organizer. As the dissent noted, all athletic rules are
arbitrary; a person at some point in time just made them up, so who is to say
which rules are fundamental to the game? 69 In fact, when any sport is viewed
in the abstract, it would not be difficult for judges to justify ad hoc decisions
through a one-sided, detailed analysis ofthe individual's particular disability and
how difficult it is for the individual to participate during the course of the game.
For example, suppose Martin was competing in a marathon and requested
the use of a cart; surely everyone would argue that running is an essential
160. Id. at 690; see 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
161. PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 682-83.
162. Id. at 682.
163. Id. at 683.
164. See Olinger v. U.S. Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1006-07 (7th Cir. 2000);
McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453,461-64 (4th Cir. 1997);
Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995); and
Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 929-30 (8th Cir. 1994).
165. PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 686.
166. Id. at 683-88.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 700-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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element of the sport, but is the length of the marathon an essential element?
What if a runner had difficulty with steep hills due to his or her disability?
Would the courts decide that running marathons outdoors is not an essential
element, forcing further competitions to be run inside so that every runner is
affected equally? Using the majority's test, a judge could certainly say that the
fundamental aspect of a marathon is running the required distance in the best
possible time; therefore, accommodations made to the particular course would
not represent a fundamental alteration. Ad hoc decisions such as this make it
almost impossible for operators of athletic competitions to decide what
accommodations must be made without enduring endless litigation. Justice
Scalia is correct in stating that this will inevitably result in public
accommodations refusing to modify any portion of athletic competitions and
instead taking their chances in court.'
If, however, the court used a test that considered the individual aspects of
the public accommodation, the organizers of sporting events would be better able
to apply self-evaluation techniques to determine if the needed accommodation
would represent a fundamental alteration. For example, in the marathon analogy
above, the purpose of the particular marathon in question may be more than the
actual event itself. The organizers may want to publicize the downtown area of
a city or provide increased advertisement to local businesses. In that situation,
running the marathon on the actual streets of the city may be a fundamental
aspect of that particular race.
In the PGA Tour, Inc. decision, the Court should have analyzed the
individual aspects of PGA Tour's events, not the game of golf in general. In
developing its test, the Court should have considered the differences between
PGA Tour's professional events and the game of golf played on the amateur
level across the country. In the arena of professional sports, owners and
organizers of events are businesses. Those who participate are, for the most part,
participating to make a living. Thus, organizers must consider the financial
aspect of the event as much a part of the game as any of the actual rules of the
game itself. In order to draw top players and survive as a business, organizers
must attract advertising revenue and obtain a fan base for merchandising and
ticket sales. Though it was not argued at trial,' PGA Tour may have an interest
in having players walk the course so that fans have a chance to interact with the
players or so that advertisers have a better opportunity for their products to be
seen. A high school athletic organization, on the other hand, would not have
these concerns. Instead of revenue and advertising concerns, it would, for
example, have an interest in seeing that its eligibility requirements are met. 72
170. Id. at 704-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998).
172. See generally McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453
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While these are hypothetical interests, they are, however, examples of the types
of interests that should be considered when analyzing areas of public
accommodations. Thus, any test used must take into account each individual
aspect of the public accommodation in order to determine which aspects are
fundamental to the nature of those activities.
The real tragedy of the decision is that the majority had a clear opportunity
to provide arule that would allow operators of athletic competitions to decide for
themselves what modifications would result in a fundamental alteration of their
respective sports. The Supreme Court majority could have used an analysis
similar to the analysis used by the courts in Sandison,' 3 McPhearson,7 4 and
Pottgen,'75 which looks at the individual aspects of the operator to determine if
the proposed rule change would represent a fundamental alteration of that
particular competition. The Court could have provided clear guidelines for
operators of athletic competitions to evaluate themselves, avoiding undue
administrative and financial burdens. By doing this, the Court would have
provided a useful tool for operators of athletic competitions while still reaching
a decision that allowed Martin the use of a cart in PGA Tour's events.
176
All of this would have been accomplished by using a test much like that
proposed by Justice Scalia in the dissent to determine whether a modification
fundamentally alters an organizer's game. By analyzing the game of golf as
played on the PGA Tour and PGA Tour events, the Court could have concluded
that PGA Tour's use of carts in the first rounds of the "Q-school," its hard card
rules permitting carts in specific instances (to speed up play before or after a
delay, etc.), and the use of carts in other PGA Tour events demonstrate that
walking is not a fundamental aspect of the PGA Tour game of golf. There is no
need to examine the "essence" of the game of golf generally; rather the focus is
on the game as played by the particular accommodation.
The same sort of analysis should be used with respect to any public
accommodations, not just competitive sports. For example, suppose a recent law
school graduate, with a disability that limits his or her ability to work forty hours
a week, signs a contract to work for a local law firm that requires attorneys to
work more than fifty hours a week. Would requiring the law firm to change its
policy in order to accommodate the new attorney represent a fundamental
alteration of the firm's business? Applying the test used in PGA Tour, Inc., "
(6th Cir. 1997); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir.
1995).
173. 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
174. 119 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1997).
175. 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994).
176. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 690 (2001).
177. Id. at 682-83.
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a court would look at the general practice of law in the abstract and make an ad
hoc determination of the fundamental nature of the length of legal work weeks.
This is an absurd result. Instead, the court should use a test which takes into
account the individual law firm and its interest in having a fifty-hour work week.
It may be that the firm specializes in being available to its clients twenty-four
hours a day and that such availability is fundamental to its business. On the
other hand, the firm may just want to squeeze as many hours as it can out of
young associates, an aspect that is most likely not fundamental to its practice.
In any case, it is the individual business characteristics that are important in
determining the fundamental aspects of an accommodation, and these
characteristics should be the foundation of any test used by the courts to make
a decision under Title Ill. The analysis of the Supreme Court in the PGA Tour,
Inc. decision fails to do this and, instead, relies on ad hoc judicial determinations,
opening the floodgates of potential litigation and creating uncertainty for all
public accommodations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The holding in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, though it ultimately reaches the
correct result, fails to provide a standard that organizers of athletic competitions
can use to make individual decisions whether or not proposed rule modifications
would result in a fundamental alteration of their competition under Title III of
the ADA. Instead, the decision provides a test by which judges make ad hoc
determinations of whether the proposed rule to be changed is fundamental to the
game in a general sense. The Court had the opportunity to follow the general
analysis of other federal court decisions and provide an individualized test for
organizers to apply but failed to do so. As a result, the Court has created
uncertainty in this area of law and opened up the floodgates of potential Title I
litigation. Operators of athletic competitions now have the incentive to refuse
to modify voluntarily athletic competitions and take their chances in court. This
is a loss for both public accommodations and disabled individuals, while the
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